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INTRODUCTION
Bill’s home sits high in the mountains of northern Idaho. In the
summertime, he likes to watch deer scamper around his backyard while he
sips hot coffee and reads the local newspaper. Bill, however, spends more
mornings in Alaska than in Idaho. His chain of popular restaurants,
Buffalo Bill’s, has locations in many Alaskan cities. The success of Bill’s
business, particularly its “famous” Wild West Buffalo Burger, has allowed
the Idahoan to build a restaurant empire throughout Alaska.
Bill pays his fair share in Alaska state taxes, and his restaurants
employ hundreds of waiters, bussers, managers, cooks, and dishwashers
across the state. To protect and promote his business interests in Alaska,
Bill spends more than half of the year traveling throughout the state,
strengthening his relationships with the locals and their elected leaders.
Because Bill resides in Idaho, however, he cannot vote in any Alaskan
elections. He supports his favorite candidates when he can, but his busy
schedule limits the amount of time he can devote to campaigning personally
for any one candidate. The most effective, efficient, and meaningful way
Bill can support candidates is through monetary contributions.
Bill can make campaign contributions to candidates for state office in
nearly every state in the nation to the same extent as residents in those
states.1 In Alaska, however, Bill has a problem. Alaska is one of two states
that place special limitations on the ability of out-of-state residents to
donate money to candidates seeking in-state office.2 Alaska’s law limits
Bill’s ability to donate in a state where his business creates hundreds of
jobs, leads to millions of dollars in state tax revenue, and regularly fills the
bellies of Alaskans with thick, juicy burgers. In today’s highly mobile
society, many Americans just like Bill have significant interests in states
other than the ones in which they legally reside. Potential cross-border
concerns range from those of parents with children in other states to
coastal residents worried about state environmental policies that could
Copyright 2018, by BEN WALLACE.
1. See State Limits on Contributions to Candidates, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/ContributionLimits
toCandidates2015-2016.pdf (last updated May 2016) (providing a chart comparing
laws that limit individual contributions in every state) [https://perma.cc/TT85RTBC].
2. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (capping the amount of contributions
candidates may receive from nonresidents—for example, $20,000 for gubernatorial
candidates and $5,000 for state senatorial candidates); see also HAW. REV. STAT. §
11-362 (2017) (prohibiting Hawaiian candidates from collecting more than 30% of
total contributions from nonresidents).
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affect their homes. In such high-stakes matters, special limits placed on
the rights of Americans to associate with candidates in other states create
troubling First Amendment concerns.3
The First Amendment prohibits governments from “abridging the
freedom of speech.”4 Though originally applicable only to Congress,5 the
First Amendment has long been held to apply to state and municipal
governments through the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.6 In addition, the term “speech” within the First Amendment
has been interpreted to include a wide variety of other activities, such as rights
of political expression and association.7 Making campaign contributions
involves the exercise of both rights.8 Courts are split on whether state
nonresident political contribution limits violate the First Amendment, which

3. This Comment focuses on how such limits interfere with First
Amendment rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). It is entirely possible—and perhaps even
likely—that such laws also infringe upon other constitutional provisions such as
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause. See Mitchell L. Pearl & Mark Lopez, Against Act 64:
Preserving Political Freedom for the Candidate and the Citizen, Brief for the
Appellants in Landell v. Sorrell, 27 VT. L. REV. 721 (2003) (discussing how
Vermont’s law limiting nonresident contributions in state elections likely violates
all three constitutional provisions). One intriguing question is whether the multiple
constitutional protections combined could invalidate laws limiting nonresident
contributions, even if no single constitutional protection clearly prohibits such laws.
See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067
(2016) (showing the history of the Supreme Court’s willingness to entertain such
arguments).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. This was true for the entire Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law . . . .”); see also Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (extending application of the First
Amendment to the state governments); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 761 (2010) (citing Gitlow for the proposition that the First Amendment falls
within the Bill of Rights protections incorporated by the Due Process Clause).
7. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
8. Id. (“When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises
both of those rights: The contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support for
the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.’”
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21–22)).
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has created a hole in First Amendment campaign finance jurisprudence.9 To
fill this gap in the law, provide clear guidance for legislators, and protect the
political association rights of nonresidents, the United States Supreme Court
should, at its next opportunity, invalidate state nonresident contribution limits.
Recent Court rulings dictate the direction it should take.10 Nonresidents
without voting power should possess the ability to donate to political
campaigns to the same extent as residents as a means of protecting legitimate
interests. No one would seriously contest Bill’s right to campaign voluntarily
on behalf of a candidate for governor in Alaska by, for example, knocking
on doors or passing out flyers. But because such activity is impractical for
people like Bill, nonresident contribution limits effectively restrict their
ability to participate in state elections in which they have legitimate
interests.
Part I of this Comment introduces federal campaign finance regulation
before summarizing Buckley v. Valeo,11 the root from which all subsequent
campaign finance jurisprudence sprouted. Next, Part II presents a holistic
overview of state nonresident contribution limits caselaw and then
inspects recent Supreme Court decisions that altered the campaign finance
jurisprudential landscape within the context of the First Amendment. In
Part III, this Comment analyzes the constitutionality of nonresident
contribution limits, weaving in policy reasons supporting the invalidation of
such laws. Finally, Part IV examines the extent to which states should have
the power to restrict any political activity to their own residents without
violating the First Amendment.
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Federal lawmakers began policing money’s role in politics more than
a century ago.12 Since then, many ambitious politicians have introduced

9. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska
1999) (upholding Alaska nonresident contribution limits), with VanNatta v. Keisling,
151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating Oregon nonresident contribution
limits); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating Vermont
nonresident contribution limits), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds).
10. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (expanding, in general, the First Amendment’s protection of political
association rights); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (creating an especially high First
Amendment hurdle for contribution limits in general).
11. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
12. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41542, THE STATE OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1
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legislative proposals seeking to restrict the potentially corrupting influence
of money in elections.13 But the suggestions have rarely resulted in major
legislative change.14 The methods of regulation have remained remarkably
consistent: restricting potential funding sources, requiring the disclosure
of permissible funding sources, and limiting campaign contributions.15
The efforts, however, have proven mostly ineffective.16
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act
Understanding modern campaign finance reform requires an introduction
to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).17 Though the initial
Act focused mostly on disclosure requirements and hardly resembled the
law’s present form,18 the Act and its subsequent amendments still serve as
the federal government’s central campaign finance legislation.19 In 1974,
prompted in part by the Watergate scandal,20 Congress passed the first of

(2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41542.pdf (providing the history of
federal involvement in campaign finance beginning with the 1907 Tillman Act, which
prohibited federal contributions from nationally chartered banks and corporations)
[https://perma.cc/JX2P-6FYB].
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1.
16. See Michael A. Nemeroff, The Limited Role of Campaign Finance Laws
in Reducing Corruption by Elected Public Officials, 49 HOW. L.J. 687, 695 (2006)
(“Campaign finance laws do not appear to have much impact on the public’s
perception of corruption of the political process. Similarly, these laws also appear
to have little impact on election outcomes.”).
17. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30145 (2012)).
18. See id.; see also GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3.
19. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that FECA “remains the
foundation of the nation’s campaign finance law”).
20. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences
of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1055 (1996) (explaining how
public response to the Watergate scandal led Congress to pass the 1974 FECA
amendments, “the toughest and most thorough federal campaign-regulation measures
ever passed”). The Watergate scandal refers to former President Richard Nixon’s
involvement in a massive scheme of promised political favors and spying funded in
part by a secret campaign slush fund. See generally Carl Bernstein & Bob
Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aids Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST (Oct. 10,
1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotageddemocrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html [https://perma.cc /7R4W-F2LU].
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several amendments to FECA.21 Changes included new provisions
limiting the amount of money that individuals,22 corporations,23 and
political committees24 could give directly to candidates for federal
office—referred to generally as contribution limits.25 The new provisions
also placed limits on the amount of money individuals and other groups
could spend advocating for a particular candidate—referred to generally
as expenditure limits.26 In sum, a contribution involves giving money to a
candidate. An expenditure involves spending money on behalf of a
candidate.
The early FECA amendments distinguished expenditures made in
coordination with a particular candidate from so-called “independent
expenditures.”27 Independent expenditures involve spending that expressly
endorses or rejects a particular candidate without the involvement of
candidates or their campaigns in the production of such messages.28
Candidates and their campaign teams have considerable freedom to spend

21. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining how FECA was first
enacted in 1971 and “substantially amended” in 1974, 1976, and 1979).
22. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (2012) (placing certain limits on the amount of
money individuals may contribute to candidates for federal office).
23. See id. § 30118 (prohibiting corporations and unions from directly
contributing to federal election campaigns).
24. See § 30116(a)(2) (limiting the amount of money political committees
may contribute to federal candidates and other political committees); see also id.
§ 30101(4) (providing a statutory definition for “political committee”).
25. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The distinction between
contribution limits and expenditure limits, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:42
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-the-distinction-betweencontribution-limits-and-expenditure-limits/ (defining contribution limits as
“restrictions on the amount that a person can give to a candidate or political
committee”) [https://perma.cc/R2AW-NG2V]; see also § 30101(8)(A)–(B)
(providing a statutory definition for “contribution”).
26. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25 (explaining that expenditure limits
restrict how much money a person or group may spend on its own to promote a
candidate or issue); see also § 30101(9)(A)–(B) (providing a statutory definition
for “expenditure”).
27. See § 30101(17) (providing the statutory definition for “independent
expenditure”).
28. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 5–6, 5 n.21 (“Independent expenditures
explicitly call for election or defeat of political candidates (known as express
advocacy), may occur at any time, and are usually (but not always) broadcast
advertisements. They must also be uncoordinated with the campaign in
question.”) (citations omitted).
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“contributions” as they see fit,29 but candidates may not direct, coordinate,
or participate in “independent expenditure” spending by groups that support
them.30 The importance of the distinction between contributions and
independent expenditures to today’s campaign finance regulatory landscape
cannot be overstated. Contributions remain highly regulated across the
country at the state31 and federal levels.32 Independent expenditures, however,
exist largely unrestricted.33
B. The Mother of All Campaign Finance Jurisprudence
In 1976, the first major challenge to FECA and its early amendments
reached the United States Supreme Court.34 Buckley v. Valeo involved First
Amendment challenges to some of FECA’s contribution and independent
expenditure limits.35 The contribution limits prohibited individuals from
giving more than $1,000 in a single year to any candidate running for federal
office.36 The independent expenditure limits prohibited individuals from
spending more than $1,000 in a single year “relative to a clearly identified
candidate.”37 The constitutional validity of both types of limits depended
on whether the government had a compelling state interest to justify each
provision’s interference with First Amendment rights of political expression
and association.38

29. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114 (listing permissible and prohibited uses of
campaign “contributions”).
30. See § 30101(17) (providing the statutory definition of an “independent
expenditure”).
31. See generally 50 State Statutory Surveys: Election Law: Campaign Finance
Reform, Limits on Individual Contributions to Candidates, Westlaw 0050 Surveys
3 (2015).
32. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116–30118.
33. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010)
(invalidating federal law that prohibited corporations and unions from spending
general treasury funds on certain independent expenditures); SpeechNow.org v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating federal laws
that limited contributions to any group that made only independent expenditures).
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. See id. at 13–14.
36. See id. at 13.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 44–45 (explaining that the constitutionality of the expenditure
limits depended on “whether the governmental interests advanced in its support
satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment
rights of political expression”).
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The Court in Buckley ultimately invalidated FECA’s ceilings on
independent expenditures but upheld the law’s limits on contributions.39
The Court held that both contribution and independent expenditure limits
interfered with First Amendment rights, but contribution limits created
“only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication.”40 Unlike contribution limits, independent expenditure
limits represented “substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on
the quantity and diversity of political speech.”41
The Court’s reasoning can be explained as follows:42 a donor who
spends money advocating on behalf of a candidate controls the message.
That is, the donor making an expenditure can choose what the message
says, who says it, where it is said, and how it is delivered. But donors who
give money to a candidate do not control the message—the candidate
controls the message. The message conveyed by a contribution lies in the
mere act of giving itself. Because expenditures involve a more direct form
of speech than contributions, expenditures deserve more protection under
the First Amendment.43
The Court’s distinction between contributions and independent
expenditures—the latter receiving more constitutional protection than the
former44—laid the foundation for the deregulation of independent
expenditures.45
Even more significant in Buckley was the Court’s recognition of
FECA’s “primary purpose” as limiting “the actuality and appearance of
39. Id. at 58.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 19.
42. See id. at 19–21 (distinguishing the level of political speech involved in
contributions from that in expenditures).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 23. But see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct.
1434, 1448 (2014) (“[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to
participate in the public debate through political expression and political
association. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises
both of those rights: [t]he contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support
for the candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a
candidate.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 21–22) The
court’s reasoning seems to indicate the distinction is not as black and white as it
once was. See id.
45. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010)
(invalidating laws that limit independent expenditures); SpeechNow.org v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating federal laws
that limited contributions to political committees that made only independent
expenditures and not contributions).
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corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions.”46 The
Court held that the government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption,47 or its appearance, sufficiently justified FECA’s contribution
limits but not the law’s independent expenditure limits.48 Although later
courts relied on this language to find that preventing corruption was the
only government interest that could justify speech-infringing campaign
finance restrictions,49 the Court in Buckley actually qualified the anticorruption interest within the broader goal of “safeguarding the integrity
of the electoral process.”50 Regardless, the opinion stands for the principle
that only preventing corruption can justify First Amendment interference
created by campaign finance laws.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: A STATE-CIRCUIT SPLIT PUNCTUATED BY A
FRESH TAKE ON MONEY IN POLITICS AT THE SUPREME COURT
The substantial early amendments to FECA that created campaign
contribution and expenditure limits prompted states across the country to
adopt similar laws.51 It was not until nearly 20 years after Buckley, however,
that a few states began experimenting with nonresident contribution limits.52
In every state that has implemented nonresident contribution limits, the
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
47. See, e.g., id. at 26–27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”); see also
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (defining “quid pro quo corruption” as “the
notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money”); Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 360 (explaining that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption”).
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
49. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441–42 (explaining that campaign
finance restrictions pursuing objectives other than preventing quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance “impermissibly inject the Government ‘into the
debate over who should govern.’ And those who govern should be the last people
to help decide who should govern.” (quoting Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011))).
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
51. See Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age
of Super PACs, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755, 764–65 (2012).
52. See, e.g., VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Or. 1995)
(explaining that Oregon voters passed “Measure 6,” the constitutional amendment
containing the nonresident contribution limits, in November 1994), aff’d, 151
F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597,
600 (Alaska 1999) (explaining that the Alaska legislature created its nonresident
contribution limits in 1996).
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laws operate in a similar way. First, the laws do not regulate out-of-state
residents directly but instead indirectly regulate them by placing limits on
the amount of money in-state candidates can accept from out-of-state
residents.53 Second, although the laws do not bar out-of-state contributions
entirely, the laws create ceilings on nonresident campaign contributions.54
These restrictions effectively bar contributions once a certain threshold—
either a specified amount or a percentage of total donations, depending on
the state law—is met.55
For example, consider Bill, the restaurant entrepreneur. Alaska’s law
does not completely prohibit him or other nonresidents from contributing
money to an Alaskan gubernatorial candidate’s campaign.56 But once a
particular gubernatorial candidate accepts $20,000 from nonresidents in a
given year, Alaska’s law prohibits the candidate from collecting a single
dollar from Bill or any other nonresident for the remainder of the year. 57
Although such laws avoid the jurisdictional and sovereignty issues created
by directly regulating nonresidents, nonresident contribution limits create
serious First Amendment concerns.58

53. See OR. CONST. art. II, § 22 (effectively prohibiting candidates from
collecting more than ten percent of their contributions from out-of-district
residents), invalidated by VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998);
ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (capping the amount of contributions candidates
may receive from nonresidents—for example, $20,000 for gubernatorial candidates
and $5,000 for state senatorial candidates); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (repealed
2014) (prohibiting candidates from collecting more than 25% of total campaign
contributions from out-of-state residents); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (2017)
(prohibiting candidates from collecting more than 30% of total contributions from
nonresidents).
54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
55. Compare § 15.13.072 (prohibiting candidates from collecting contributions
from nonresidents once candidates have collected a specified value of dollars from
them), with HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (prohibiting candidates from collecting
contributions from nonresidents once a certain percentage of their total
contributions consists of nonresident contributions).
56. See § 15.13.072.
57. See id.
58. See, e.g., VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1218 (invalidating Oregon nonresident
contribution limits on First Amendment grounds); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91,
98 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating Vermont nonresident contribution limits on First
Amendment grounds), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230
(2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds).
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A. Four States, Two Invalidated Laws
Four states—Oregon, Alaska, Vermont, and Hawaii—have created
nonresident contribution limits.59 In each state, lawmakers sought to prevent
outside interests from garnering outsized influence in local elections.60
Though often popular among residents and their elected representatives,61
the laws in three of the four states—Hawaii excluded—have been
challenged on First Amendment grounds.
1. Pioneers in Oregon Halted
The first state nonresident contribution limits were created by voters,
not legislators.62 In 1994, Oregon voters passed a constitutional amendment
effectively prohibiting candidates from collecting more than ten percent of
their campaign contributions from people who resided outside of their
election districts.63 The measure was intended to prevent outsiders from
“buying influence in elections” and to allow “ordinary people” to control

59. See supra text accompanying note 53. In addition, one Ohio city
implemented a nonresident contribution limit for local elections that a federal
district judge found “so clearly unconstitutional” that the law did not merit much
discussion outside of one footnote. See Frank v. City of Akron, 95 F. Supp. 706,
708 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1999), rev’d in part, 290 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2002) (reversing in
part on other grounds without addressing Akron’s nonresident contribution limits).
60. See, e.g., VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Or. 1995)
(identifying the purpose of Oregon’s law), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998);
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617 (Alaska 1999) (identifying
the purpose of Alaska’s law); Landell, 382 F.3d at 99–102 (identifying some of the
purposes of Vermont’s law); J. 23-185, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005) (Conf. Rep.),
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2005/commreports/HB1747_CD1_CCR185
_.htm (identifying the purpose of Hawaii’s law as to “ensure that elected officials
are not disproportionately influenced by outside interests”) [https://perma.cc
/T3AU-MP3L].
61. See, e.g., Andrew Hyman, Comment, Alaska Gives Ninth Circuit the Cold
Shoulder: Conflicts in Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1453, 1477–78, 1477 n.152 (2004) (noting the general popularity of statutes
aimed at leveling the playing field); see also Landell, 382 F.3d at 100 (noting the
“powerful support among the Vermont electorate for fundamental reform to the
State’s campaign financing scheme”).
62. See VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 491 (explaining that Oregon voters passed
“Measure 6,” the constitutional amendment containing the nonresident contribution
limits, in November 1994), aff’d, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998).
63. See OR. CONST. art. II, § 22, invalidated by VanNatta, 151 F.3d 1215.
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their own government.64 When challenged on First Amendment grounds,
Oregon’s federal district court invalidated the measure.65
The district court in VanNatta v. Keisling found that the law suffered
from three flaws. First, the measure prevented the extent to which state
residents could politically associate with candidates from other districts
whose actions likely would affect residents of the entire state, not just the
candidate’s constituents.66 Second, the measure did nothing to prevent indistrict donors from contributing large amounts of money that could
corrupt the political process.67 Third, because the law’s restrictions were
based on a percentage of total donations, it failed to eliminate large outof-district donations so long as a candidate could raise significant indistrict donations.68 Because the law failed to achieve its purpose—
preventing corruption—the court struck it down.69
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision.70 The
Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the district court’s reasoning related to
the law’s shortcomings in preventing corruption.71 The appellate court also
rejected the separate state interest of preserving a republican form of
government as insufficient to justify the law’s interference with the free
association rights of nonresidents.72 The majority’s opinion recognized
that “[t]he Supreme Court has suggested that states have a strong interest
in ensuring that elected officials represent those who elect them,”73 but the
majority distinguished Oregon’s law from two cases in which the United
States Supreme Court recognized such an interest.74 Because the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in VanNatta,75 the Court effectively upheld the
lower court decisions that found Oregon’s law unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.

64. See VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 491.
65. See id. at 497.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998).
71. Id. at 1216–18.
72. See id. at 1217–18.
73. See id. at 1218.
74. See id. (distinguishing Oregon’s law from laws unrelated to campaign
finance upheld by the Supreme Court in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60 (1978), and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
75. Miller v. VanNatta, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999).
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2. Frontiersmen in Alaska Succeed
While the constitutional challenge to Oregon’s law made its way
through the appellate review process, Alaskans enacted their own
nonresident contribution limits76 as part of broader campaign finance
reform legislation.77 The stated legislative purpose of the reform was to
“restore the public’s trust in the electoral process and to foster good
government.”78 The legislation also was intended to address public
concerns about “actual and apparent corruption in Alaska politics.”79
Within months of the law’s passage, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union
challenged the law on First Amendment grounds.80
Alaska’s Supreme Court took a much different approach to Alaska’s
nonresident contribution limits than the Ninth Circuit did to Oregon’s law.
The court in State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union held that Alaska’s
nonresident contribution limits did not violate the First Amendment because
the limits were narrowly tailored to address the state’s interest in preventing
“distortion” of the political process by outsiders.81 Confusingly, the court
held that preventing corruption did not justify Alaska’s law but that
preventing “purchased or coerced influence” by nonresidents did.82 Overall,
76. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.072 (2017) (providing the following limits
per calendar year: $20,000 for gubernatorial candidates; $5,000 for state senatorial
candidates; and $3,000 for state representative candidates and candidates for
municipal or other offices). The law also limits the amount of contributions
candidates may accept from nonresident groups. See id. (prohibiting candidates
from accepting contributions from nonresident groups and prohibiting resident
groups from accepting more than ten percent of their total donations from
nonresidents).
77. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 600–02 (Alaska
1999) (discussing the history of Alaska’s campaign finance reform).
78. Act of May 30, 1996, ch. 48, § 1, 1996 Alaska Leg. Serv. 1.
79. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 601.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 617 (upholding the law even though Alaska produced “no
evidence relating to the potential impact” of out-of-state contributions); see also
Hyman, supra note 61, at 1478 (explaining how the state supreme court had no
problem validating the law once it determined the government interest was
preventing outsiders from dominating the political process, because a law limiting
nonresident contributions is clearly tailored to such an interest).
82. Compare Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 615 (“The State refers
us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of corruption caused
by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid pro quo corruption
justifies these restraints.”), with id. at 617 (“Without restraints, Alaska’s elected
officials can be subjected to purchased or coerced influence which is grossly
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the court appeared to recognize several other state interests as justifications
for Alaska’s law.83 The opinion shows how government interests
necessary to justify First Amendment infringement often overlap and can
be difficult to distinguish.84
The Alaska Supreme Court avoided the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive
holding—an especially notable move because Alaska sits within the Ninth
Circuit—by distinguishing Alaska’s law from Oregon’s.85 First, the court
explained that Alaska’s law interfered less with the political association
rights of in-state residents because the law’s limitation applied only to outof-state residents, not out-of-district residents who lived within the state.86
Second, the court contended that Alaska’s law affected nonresidents less
than Oregon’s because Alaska does not share a border with any other state.87
When the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Alaska Civil
Liberties Union,88 the Court left standing a nuanced distinction. On the one
hand, state laws limiting the ability of in-state residents to contribute to
candidates seeking statewide office in an election district where the residents
did not live and could not vote were unconstitutional.89 On the other hand,
state laws that limited the ability of all out-of-state residents to contribute to
election campaigns in states where they did not reside were constitutional.90
This distinction, however, did not last long.91
disproportionate to the support nonresidents’ views have among the Alaska
electorate, Alaska’s contributors, and those most intimately affected by elections,
Alaska residents.”). The court did not explain the difference between “corruption”
on the one hand and “purchased or coerced influence” on the other. See id.
83. See Hyman, supra note 61, at 1475 (identifying three broad interests
recognized by the court: ensuring the integrity of the political structures and
processes; preventing nonresident contributors from drowning out the voices of
Alaska residents; and preventing distortion of public opinion).
84. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 341, 387 (2009) (explaining several different concepts used by the Court to
identify corruption).
85. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 616.
86. See id.
87. See id. The court did not provide further explanation about why Alaska’s
isolation had less of an impact on nonresidents. See id. Presumably, the court
assumed nonresidents had fewer interactions with, and interests in, Alaska
because of its geographic segregation from the contiguous United States.
88. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000).
89. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating
Oregon’s nonresident contribution limits).
90. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597.
91. See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (invalidating Vermont
nonresident contribution limits that applied only to out-of-state residents), rev’d
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3. Good Try, Vermont
The most recent challenge to a state law that placed special limitations
on nonresident contributions occurred in the early 2000s. Landell v.
Sorrell involved a First Amendment challenge to a Vermont statute that
prohibited candidates from collecting more than 25% of their campaign
contributions from out-of-state residents.92 Like Alaska, Vermont created
its nonresident contribution limits as part of broader campaign finance
legislation.93 In particular, Vermont sought to limit large contributions
from nonresident individuals and groups to “level the playing field”94 and
encourage more residents to participate in funding election campaigns as
a means of increasing “public confidence and the robust debate of
issues.”95 The state’s nonresident contribution limits, however, did not
withstand a First Amendment challenge.96
Following the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit in Landell held that
Vermont’s law was both overbroad and underinclusive as it related to the
state’s interest in preventing corruption.97 The court described the statute
as overbroad because it ultimately prohibited small contributions from
nonresidents that likely would not lead to corruption.98 The statute’s
underbreadth, meanwhile, stemmed from its failure to prevent corrupting
contributions before a candidate reached the 25% ceiling.99 The Second
Circuit found “no sufficiently important government interest” narrowly
in part sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing Second Circuit
on other grounds).
92. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (repealed 2014), invalidated by Landell,
382 F.3d at 98.
93. See Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, 1997 Vt. Acts & Resolves
490, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/1998/acts/act064.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZJ4S6EU]; see also Landell, 382 F.3d at 99–102 (discussing the Act’s history and
purpose).
94. “Leveling the playing field” involves preventing the speech of some
people to promote, enable, or strengthen the speech of other people. At least one
scholar equates “leveling the playing field” with equalizing otherwise unfair
monetary advantages in the election process, analogizing the Court’s treatment of
equality as a governmental interest in campaign finance to “Voldemort” in the
Harry Potter series, “the idea that must not be named.” See Daniel P. Tokaji, The
Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A Trans-Border
Comparison, 5 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 381, 381–82 (2011).
95. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 100.
96. Id. at 148.
97. Id. at 147.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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tailored to support Vermont’s law.100 The court also questioned the
reasoning behind the Alaska Supreme Court’s contrary ruling.101 Unlike
the court in Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the Landell court did not find
meaningful differences among Vermont’s, Alaska’s, and Oregon’s
nonresident contribution limits.102 Although the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Landell, ultimately reversing much of the
Second Circuit’s decision, the Court’s opinion did not address Vermont’s
nonresident contribution limits.103
4. An Island in Hawaii
The United States Supreme Court has left open the possibility that
nonresident contribution limits, at least in some cases, do not violate the
First Amendment. Shortly after the Second Circuit’s ruling in Landell,
Hawaii implemented its own nonresident contribution limits.104 Like
lawmakers in Alaska and Vermont, Hawaiian legislators sought to justify
the law by voicing their concern with outside influence in its governing
process and elections.105 Although Alaska and Hawaii are the only two
states with nonresident contribution limits, as long as the statutes exist,
other states wary of increased outside influence could be encouraged to
100. Id. at 146–47 (“We find no support in the record for the alternative claim
that Vermont has an important interest in singling out one class of contributors
for limitations.”).
101. See id. at 148.
102. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 616–17
(Alaska 1999) (distinguishing Alaska’s limits from Oregon’s), with Landell, 382
F.3d at 147–48.
103. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
104. H.R. 1747, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005), http://www.capitol.hawaii
.gov/session2005/bills/HB1747_cd1_.htm [https://perma.cc/3PP7-NW3G]. The
original statute, Hawaii Revised Statutes § 11-204.5, which since has been repealed,
actually limited the amount of total contributions state candidates could collect from
nonresidents to 20%. The 2010 amendments to Hawaii’s campaign finance laws
increased the permissible amount to 30% of total contributions, but various
legislative documents do not indicate the reason for the increase. See H.B. 2003,
25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2010) (“The purpose of this part is to ensure the
integrity and transparency in the campaign finance process . . . . Any ambiguity in
the provisions of this part shall be construed in favor of transparency.”).
105. See J. 23-185, Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2005) (Conf. Rep.), http://www.capitol
.hawaii.gov/session2005/commreports/HB1747_CD1_CCR185_.htm (“Restrictions
on nonresident contributions will ensure that elected officials are not
disproportionately influenced by outside interests.”) [https://perma.cc/9MSZKQDN].
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limit nonresident participation in their political process in similar ways.
Recent activity in the United States Supreme Court, however, suggests any
First Amendment challenge to a nonresident contribution limit would
succeed.
B. The Heightened First Amendment Protection of Political Spending
A pair of recent Supreme Court rulings—Citizens United v. FEC106
and McCutcheon v. FEC107—represent some of the most fundamental
changes to campaign finance law in decades.108 Taken together, Citizens
United and McCutcheon broadened First Amendment rights in the context
of campaign finance restrictions and narrowed the government’s options
when regulating campaign spending.109 Although neither decision directly
addressed the constitutionality of state nonresident contribution limits, the
Court’s rulings heightened the threshold a law must overcome when
challenged on First Amendment grounds.110
Citizens United, arguably the most famous Supreme Court decision in
the past decade, established the Herculean strength of the First
Amendment’s protection of campaign speech and association.111 The case
involved a First Amendment challenge to federal laws that prohibited
corporations and unions from making independent expenditures using
their general treasury funds for express advocacy and “electioneering
communications.”112 The Court ultimately invalidated the laws, rejecting
the governmental interests of “leveling the playing field”113 and preventing

106. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
107. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
108. See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 2.
109. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434.
110. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434.
111. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.
112. See id. at 320–21 (explaining that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(“BRCA”) of 2002 amendments to FECA created a prohibition on electioneering
communication spending); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)–(B) (2012)
(providing a statutory definition of “electioneering communication,” which
generally includes any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that “refers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” made within 60 days of a general
election or 30 days of a primary election).
113. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50 (“[T]he concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976))).
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“distortion”114 of the political process as insufficient to justify the burdens
on political speech and association created by the laws. 115 In doing so, the
Court indicated that preventing quid pro quo corruption likely was the only
governmental interest sufficient to justify campaign spending limits.116
Four years later, in McCutcheon,117 the Court confirmed what it hinted
at in Citizens United.118 In McCutcheon, the Court invalidated a federal
law that created aggregate limits on individual contributions to candidates
for federal office,119 slightly weakening the previously significant distinction
between speech protections afforded to contributions and independent
expenditures.120 In sum, McCutcheon suggested that all political association
limits not narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance violate the First Amendment.121
After McCutcheon, the jurisprudence that would affect a First
Amendment challenge to state nonresident contribution limits points
decidedly in one direction.122 Alaska Civil Liberties Union stands as the
lone exception to two federal circuit court rulings that invalidated such
laws,123 and the Supreme Court has indicated in other recent campaign
114. See id. at 348–49 (identifying the antidistortion rationale as preventing
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas” (quoting
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))).
115. Id. at 339–40.
116. See id. at 357–61.
117. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442, 1462.
120. See id. at 1448 (“[T]he First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right
to participate in the public debate through political expression and political
association. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both
of those rights: [t]he contribution ‘serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views’ and ‘serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.’”)
(citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 21–22 (1976))).
121. See James Bopp, Jr., Randy Elf & Anita Y. Milanovich, Contribution Limits
After McCutcheon v. FEC, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 395 (2015) (“McCutcheon not
only substantially changes, but makes more rigorous the analysis used in challenges
to regulations of contributions for independent spending and of direct contributions
to candidates. Both types of contribution limits are likely unconstitutional under its
framework.”).
122. See infra Part III.
123. Compare State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617
(Alaska 1999) (upholding Alaska nonresident contribution limits), with VanNatta
v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998) (invalidating Oregon nonresident
contribution limits); Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146 (2d Cir. 2002)
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finance cases the position it likely would take on the issue.124 An analysis
of the constitutionality of nonresident contribution limits showcases the
significant hurdles states would face in defending such laws.125
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONRESIDENT
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
The analysis to determine whether nonresident contribution limits
violate the First Amendment involves a three-step inquiry. The first
question is whether the law burdens political expression or association.126
If it does, the second question is whether the state has a compelling
governmental interest to justify the burden on activity protected by the
First Amendment.127 Even if a compelling interest exists, however, under
the third step, the state also must show that its law is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.128 The law violates the First Amendment if it burdens
speech and the government either lacks a compelling state interest for the
law or the law is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling
interest.
A. The Heavy Burden on Out-of-State Residents
Campaign contributions represent an exercise of political expression
and association rights protected by the First Amendment.129 Nonresident
contribution limits create ceilings on the amount of contributions candidates
may accept from out-of-state residents.130 Once the ceiling is reached, the
law effectively bars nonresidents from making campaign contributions.
Such a bar clearly burdens nonresident speech protected by the First
Amendment.
(invalidating Vermont nonresident contribution limits), rev’d in part sub nom.
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other
grounds).
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. See infra Part III.
126. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340
(2010).
127. See id.
128. See id. This standard of review often is referred to as “strict scrutiny.”
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (explaining that a law only passes “strict scrutiny” if it is “narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling [g]overnment interest”).
129. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448
(2014).
130. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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In certain aspects, nonresidents deserve more political association
protection than residents. Some courts, including the Supreme Court, have
expressed sympathy for such an argument.131 Residents can always exercise
their political power by voting, whereas no state allows nonresidents to vote
in its statewide elections.132 Out-of-state residents, however, often have
legitimate interests in the policies of other states.133 As political interests of
Americans have become increasingly national in scope,134 with individuals
131. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449 (“The First Amendment burden is
especially great for individuals who do not have ready access to alternative
avenues for supporting their preferred politicians and policies.”); Landell v.
Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that nonresidents have
“legitimate and strong interests in Vermont and have a right to participate, at least
through speech,” in the election process), rev’d in part sub nom. Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (reversing the Second Circuit on other grounds). But
see Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (“[O]ur
cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict
the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its
borders.”). The Court in Holt Civic Club held that residents of an unincorporated
community could be subject to a neighboring city’s police and sanitation
regulations, among others, by state statute even though they could not participate
in the city’s political processes. See Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68–69.
132. See Voting by Nonresidents and Noncitizens, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG.
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/non-residentand-non-citizen-voting.aspx (“No state has extended noncitizen voting to statewide
elections.”) [https://perma.cc/HX3E-YYVD].
133. See Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the
Long-Armed Donor, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 77, 90–91 (2014) (explaining
that because Americans are “highly mobile and are interconnected in countless
political, economic, technological, cultural, and familial ways, it is vital that they
remain free to speak and associate across state lines in order to shape political
leaderships at all levels of government”).
134. See id. at 86 (“Cross-border political activity is a long-standing and
growing feature of our political system.”); Dan Hopkins, All Politics Is Presidential,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 17, 2014, 5:38 AM) http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/allpolitics-is-presidential/ (“In recent years, gubernatorial elections have become
increasingly nationalized, to the point where voting patterns in these races bear a
striking resemblance to those in presidential races.”) [https://perma.cc/S2BZGRM5]; Carl E. Klarner & Heather Evans, The Polarization and Nationalization of
State Elections, 1971-2014, KLARNERPOLITICS, http://klarnerpolitics.com/uploads
/3/8/5/0/3850983/featured_manuscript_-_klarner_politics.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2017) (“We also present evidence that state legislative and gubernatorial elections
have become increasingly nationalized and thus more likely to be ignored by the
electorate. This has presumably reduced the extent to which state elected officials
are held accountable by citizens.”) [https://perma.cc/3RJ6-GBJT]; Jonathan M.
Ladd, 3 Trends in This Week’s Elections: Biased Electorates, Nationalization, and
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often identifying more with a particular political party than with specific
candidates or issues,135 nonresidents may seek to create political
momentum for their parties or for candidates who share views on national
issues similar to their own by supporting them in state elections.136 Any
activities that have ripple effects in other states—for example, externalities
associated with coal mining and production—represent especially ripe
reasons for nonresidents to contribute to candidates who support their
views in other states. Moreover, Americans who travel often to other states,
whether for familial, business, or entertainment reasons, may have strong
ties and associations in those states. People like Bill, the restaurateur, should
at least be able to contribute money to out-of-state candidates to the same
extent as in-state residents.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Citizens United rejected the idea that
the government may impose political speech restrictions that discriminate
based on the identity of the speaker instead of the substance of the speech
involved.137 The Court stated,
Redistricting Reform, VOX (Nov. 5, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.vox.com/mischiefs
-of-faction/2015/11/5/9676268/redistricting-nationalization-elections (presenting
elections of Kentucky’s governor and Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court as anecdotes to
demonstrate nationalization of state elections) [https://perma.cc/F223-W6VW];
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1135 (2014)
(explaining how political engagement across state lines has “increased dramatically”
in both federal and state elections in recent years).
135. See Brian Arbour, “All Politics Is Local”? Not anymore., WASH. POST:
MONKEY CAGE (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/12/09/all-politics-is-local-not-anymore/ (explaining how the fate
of Congressional campaigns depends more on the candidate’s party affiliation
than anything else) [https://perma.cc/B8BV-JF4Z].
136. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at 1136 (identifying a handful of
legitimate reasons nonresidents may want to contribute to state election campaigns
in states where they do not reside).
137. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010)
(“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history
and logic lead us to this conclusion.”) (emphasis added); McCutcheon v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1461 (2014) (“For the past 40 years, our
campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve authority for
the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising
the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the
Government to favor some participants in that process over others.”) (emphasis
added); see also Michael Kagan, Speaker Discrimination: The Next Frontier of
Free Speech, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2015) (recognizing how
Citizens United did not “invent” the idea that the First Amendment prohibits
speaker-based discrimination, but “gave a new, clearer articulation to a principle
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By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for
the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these means
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself
what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow
from each.138
Although the Court in Citizens United suggested that the First
Amendment forbids all speaker-based discrimination, the Court has, on
many occasions, specifically allowed laws to burden the speech of some
but not others.139 Therefore, this argument likely has limits. Still, any
burden on political association that applies only to certain speakers—in
this case, out-of-state residents—likely will not pass constitutional muster
under the reasoning of Citizens United.
In addition, nonresident contribution limits always exist in conjunction
with limits on resident contributions. Nearly every state, including Alaska
and Hawaii, limits the ability of all individuals, residents and nonresidents
alike, to contribute to in-state campaigns.140 Because blanket contribution
that had long been implicit and underappreciated in free speech jurisprudence”).
But see Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause
Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 448–49 (2013) (criticizing the Court’s application of
the speaker-based discrimination principle in Citizens United and pointing to
several situations in which the Court clearly allowed speaker-based discrimination
in the context of First Amendment issues).
138. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. But see id. at 341 (identifying
exceptional cases in which the Court upheld speaker-based restrictions that “were
based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions”).
139. For examples, see McConnell, supra note 137, at 448–49.
140. See Contribution Limits Overview, N AT ’ L C ONF . OF S TATE LEG .,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contributionlimits-overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6FMJ-PB86];
see also ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.070(b)(1) (2017) (banning all individuals,
regardless of residency, from contributing more than $500 per year to a candidate
or a group that is not a political party); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-357 (a)(1)–(3)
(2017) (effectively capping contributions by individuals at $2,000 for candidates
for state representative, $4,000 for state senators, and $6,000 for governors per
election cycle). By comparison, California, New York, and Ohio each have
contribution limits for individuals in the tens of thousands of dollars. Contribution
Limits Overview, supra. Meanwhile, the following states do not place any limits
on individual contributions: Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
Contribution Limits Overview, supra.
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limits already place a burden on the political association rights of out-ofstate residents, any additional restrictions further increase the interference
with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of nonresidents, creating an
unquestionably high burden on their political association rights. At
minimum, additional nonresident contribution limits risk exacerbating the
harms associated with suppressing political speech of people like Bill, the
restauranteur, with legitimate stakes and interests in other states.
B. No Government Interest Is Sufficient to Justify the Speech
Suppression Created by Nonresident Contribution Limits
When challenged on First Amendment grounds, laws can suffer
constitutional deficiencies in two main ways. First, the government may
lack a sufficiently compelling interest to enact the law.141 Second, even if a
government has a compelling interest, the law may not be narrowly tailored
to address the compelling interest.142 State nonresident contribution limits
suffer shortcomings in both ways.
1. Nonresident Contribution Limits Prevent Participation,
but Not Corruption
The Supreme Court has made it clear: a law interfering with
Americans’ political association rights violates the First Amendment
unless it is narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance.143 State laws that limit nonresident contributions, however, do
little, if anything, to prevent the direct exchange of money for political
favors.144 As two federal circuits have pointed out, such laws often are both
overbroad and underinclusive.145 Even Alaska’s attorneys—who
successfully argued that the state’s nonresident contribution limits did not
violate the First Amendment—conceded that preventing corruption could
not justify the state’s laws.146

141. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
142. See, e.g., id.
143. See id. at 1441–42.
144. See infra notes 149–51.
145. See supra Part II.A.1.–A.3.
146. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 615 (Alaska 1999)
(“The State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of
corruption caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid
pro quo corruption justifies these restraints.”).
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At best, the effectiveness of contribution limits as a legislative tool to
prevent corruption is marginal.147 At worst, such laws actually may
incentivize, rather than deter, corruption.148 At least one study found that
campaign finance regulation has practically no effect on making the political
process more democratic.149 Similar findings prompted Congress at one
point to abandon contribution limits altogether,150 although the federal
legislature eventually brought them back in response to the Watergate
scandal.151 Particularly in an era of unlimited independent expenditures,
the effectiveness of contribution limits likely will shrink even further as
outside spending in state elections grows.152 In fact, the Supreme Court in
Buckley foreshadowed this exact issue, hinting that contribution limits
could become inappropriate if they began to impede the campaign process
147. See Gaughan, supra note 51, at 758 (asserting that contribution limits
“have failed to advance the underlying policy goals of preventing corruption”).
Some scholars have proposed abandoning contribution limits all together. See id.
at 763. See generally John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign
Finance Legislation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69 (2000) (proposing to dissolve
contribution limits and instead suggesting legislators recuse themselves from
voting on issues that would affect their contributors directly).
148. See Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution
Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption
in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 77, 118 (2011) (explaining how laws
mandating a higher number of smaller contributions from a larger donor base
increase the incentive to skirt the law all together and accept large contributions
from fewer donors).
149. See Nemeroff, supra note 16, at 693 (noting how a study of election
results between 1992 and 2004 indicated campaign finance laws neither level the
playing field nor effect party control). But see id. at 691 (“Some studies have
found that contribution limits do have a democratizing effect in that they reduce
the average amount of each contribution and ‘level the playing field’ among
various contributing groups. However, these studies did not find that contribution
limits increased the number of contributors.”).
150. Id. at 696 (“Individual contribution limits were introduced in 1925, but
were repealed when FECA was first enacted because the limits were ineffective.”).
151. See Smith, supra note 20, at 1055; see also GARRETT, supra note 12, at 3.
152. See, e.g., Liz Essley Whyte & Ashley Balcerzak, Outside Groups Playing
Bigger Role in 2015 State Elections, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Oct. 1, 2015,
5:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/10/01/18074/outside-groupsplaying-bigger-role-2015-state-elections [https://perma.cc/2T3E-Z7B7]; J.T.
Stepleton, Crossing the Line: Boosting Gubernatorial Candidates with Out-of-State
Contributions, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www
.followthemoney.org/research/institute-reports/crossing-the-line-boosting-out-ofstate-contributions-to-gubernatorial-campaigns/#ftnref_1 [https://perma.cc/Y5F4X5DQ].
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they were meant to protect.153 Laws that do not serve their stated purposes
cannot possibly be narrowly tailored to justify their existence.154
2. The Court Could, but Should Not, Recognize Two Other
Government Interests as Sufficient to Justify Nonresident
Contribution Limits
The only way nonresident contribution limits can remain constitutionally
valid is if the Supreme Court expands the list of government interests that can
justify campaign finance restrictions. Among the leading possibilities are
preserving a representative form of government and maintaining federalism.155
Despite the importance of both institutional fixtures of American government,
such interests should not overcome the high bar protecting restrictions on
political expression and association. Even though courts sometimes have
used language indicating support for additional government interests in
regulating campaign-related speech,156 the jurisprudence makes clear that
such interests should not outweigh the First Amendment burdens created
by nonresident contribution limits.

153. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“Given the important role of
contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have
a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and
political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”).
154. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1457
(2014) (invalidating a “poorly tailored” statute).
155. See Pettys, supra note 133, at 91 (identifying “the self-governance
rationale” as the governmental interest with the most promising possibility of
justifying nonresident contribution limits); Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign
Finance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 EMORY L.J. 781, 823 (2014) (proposing
that the Court recognize preserving federalism as a legitimate interest to regulate
campaign finance).
156. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339
(2010) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to
make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.” (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 14–15 (implicitly recognizing the importance of representation)));
Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“A
State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions [is] part of the sovereign’s obligation to preserve the basic
conception of a political community.” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
295–96 (1978) (implicitly recognizing state’s interest in preserving representation),
aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012))).
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a. Preserving Representation
The United States Constitution guarantees a representative government
to every state.157 But the Supreme Court has never recognized a state’s
interest in preserving a representative or “republican” form of government
to justify a nonresident contribution limit,158 even though similar interests
have been recognized as compelling in other contexts.159 Perhaps the
appointment of Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch—a replacement for the late
Antonin Scalia—will shift the Court’s philosophical makeup such that
representation could be recognized as a legitimate state interest sufficient
to justify campaign spending restrictions in the future.160 After all, at least
one retired Supreme Court justice, John Paul Stevens, believes the law
should distinguish between campaign money spent by constituents and
non-constituents,161 and Justice Stevens’s belief has doctrinal roots.162 The
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”). A “republican” form of
government is a “government by representatives chosen by the people.” Republican
government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
158. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 1998)
(rejecting the preservation of representation as insufficient to justify Oregon’s
nonresident contribution limits).
159. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985)
(recognizing in a Privileges and Immunities Clause case a state’s power to restrict
the ability to vote to ensure the boundaries of political communities); Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (recognizing in an Equal
Protection Clause case that “a government unit may legitimately restrict the right
to participate in its political processes.”).
160. See Deborah Hellman & David Schultz, Foreword to Special Issue on
Campaign Finance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 207, 209–10 (2015–2016) (noting
the court’s current vacancy combined with the likelihood of additional vacancies
soon could lead to a pro-democracy court); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that the recognition of nonresident corporate
interests potentially in conflict with constituent interests could undermine
representative democracy).
161. See Pettys, supra note 133, at 84 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying
“[v]oters’ fundamental right to participate in electing their own political leaders
is far more compelling than the right of non-voters such as corporations and nonresidents to support or oppose candidates for public office” (citing Dollars and
Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will
Affect the 2014 Elections and Beyond, Hearing on Campaign Finance Before the
Senate Rules and Administration Committee, 113th Cong., 3–5 (2014) (statement
of retired United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens))).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1; see also Deborah A. Roy, The
Narrowing Government Interest in Campaign Finance Regulations: Republic

2018]

COMMENT

623

Supreme Court, on occasion, has recognized a state’s interest in preserving
republicanism even in opinions that ultimately found certain campaign
spending limits violated the First Amendment.163 The Alaska Supreme
Court, too, expressed in dicta its support for the belief that preserving
representation justifies regulating campaign contributions.164
Furthermore, one recent case hints that the Court eventually may
recognize a state’s interest in preserving representation within the context
of contribution limits. In Bluman v. FEC,165 the Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court ruling that upheld the constitutionality of a federal law barring
foreign nationals from contributing to domestic campaigns.166 The lower
court reasoned that the federal government may exclude foreign citizens
from activities “intimately related to the process of democratic self-

Lost?, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 39 (2015) (“The Government would fare better in
defending campaign finance regulations if it began to build the foundation for a
more compelling interest that is firmly embedded in the U.S. Constitution. And
no interest is more firmly entrenched than the interest in preserving the
representative democracy.”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 449 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There are threats of corruption that
are far more destructive to a democratic society than the odd bribe.”).
163. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (“To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined.”); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (“[T]he interests
underlying contribution limits, preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption, directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process.’” (quoting
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003))); Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 339 (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential.”
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976))).
164. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 616 n.123 (Alaska
1999), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 528 U.S. 1153
(2000) (“The state’s power to preserve the political community by excluding
nonresidents from voting is self-evident. Although we have not previously affirmed
the authority of the state to limit the influence of nonresidents over state elections
through regulation of their campaign contributions, such an extension would not be
illogical.”); see also Hyman, supra note 61, at 1480 (explaining the difficulty of
identifying the boundaries of various government interests but extrapolating from
the state supreme court’s opinion that ultimately a combination of three were
recognized: “leveling the playing field, protecting the republican form of
government[,] and preventing corruption”) (emphasis added).
165. Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
166. Id. at 288.
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government.”167 Because of Bluman, at least two scholars have suggested
that the Supreme Court may be willing to uphold out-of-state contribution
limits against a constitutional challenge.168
The same two scholars, however, ultimately concluded that Bluman
probably was not significant enough to overcome other doctrinal and
normative hurdles to the constitutionality of nonresident contribution
limits.169 Most importantly, Bluman explicitly rejected an analogy between
the relationship of foreign nationals to the United States and the
relationship of American citizens to different states within the country.170
Furthermore, Alaska Civil Liberties Union rests on questionable legal
reasoning,171 VanNatta explicitly rejected the representation interest,172
and McCutcheon rejected all governmental interests except preventing
corruption as insufficient justifications for political association
restrictions.173 The doctrine, therefore, strongly suggests that preserving
representation cannot justify nonresident contribution limits.
Other hurdles exist, too. Nonresident contribution limits aimed at
reducing the influence of outsiders rest on the assumption that out-of-state
donations to state candidates will result in the promotion of policy contrary
to the interest of state residents.174 Many interests of nonresidents, however,
likely align with resident interests. In the era of unlimited independent
expenditures, many candidates for state office likely receive significant

167. Id. at 287.
168. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 133, at 86; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at
1137–38.
169. See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 133, at 89 (“There are strong reasons to doubt
that the Court would find that restrictions on out-of-state campaign spending can
be justified by sufficiently powerful governmental interests.”); Bulman-Pozen,
supra note 134, at 1141–42 (“But, I submit, partisan federalism is more consistent
with cross-border participation than with its prohibition.”).
170. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
171. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 615 (Alaska 1999)
(“The State refers us to no specific evidence of corruption or the appearance of
corruption caused by out-of-state contributions, and does not contend that quid
pro quo corruption justifies these restraints.”).
172. See VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014).
174. See Tyler S. Roberts, Note, Enhanced Disclosure as a Response to
Increasing Out-of-State Spending in State and Local Elections, 50 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 137, 153 (2016) (identifying three main harms of nonresident
political spending: drowned-out in-state political voices; favoritism by elected
officials toward out-of-state donors; and reduced experimentation in local
legislation).
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support from super PACs funded in large part by nonresidents.175
Nonresidents with legitimate local interests in other states could provide
direct donations to candidates who want to protect local interests from being
overshadowed by national agendas. Equipping candidates with more funding
of their own, regardless of the source, may even strengthen the ability of
candidates to represent their constituents.
b. Maintaining Federalism
In addition to protecting political representation, another government
interest the Court could recognize to justify nonresident contribution limits
is a state’s interest in maintaining federalism. Under a strong view of
federalism,176 states serve as more effective “laboratories”177 for legislative
experimentation if government representatives focus on local interests.178 At
least one scholar has explained that the risks to federalism presented by
increased outside spending are most severe in state elections.179 Further,
because neither Alaska nor Hawaii shares a border with any other state,
perhaps special geographic factors reduce the number of legitimate interests
nonresidents have in those states. Such reasoning could explain the special
discrimination against out-of-state residents under a strong view of
federalism.
Nevertheless, promoting federalism does not justify state nonresident
contribution limits. First, the popularization of residency-based discrimination
could encourage elected candidates and courts to substantiate state
protectionism, potentially undermining a federal form of government. 180
Second, cross-border political participation actually emphasizes the role
of states in the country’s political system.181 If states were politically
175. “Super PACs” are “independent political action committees . . . or other
independent political advocacy groups that engage in campaign advertising but
do not coordinate their expenditures with candidates or political parties.”
Gaughan, supra note 51, at 759–60.
176. Strong federalism is the inverse of strong nationalism. See BulmanPozen, supra note 134, at 1140 (explaining how cross-border political activity
may be proscribed under a strong federalism view).
177. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”) (emphasis added).
178. See generally Pursley, supra note 155.
179. See id. at 823 (“Political safeguards work only if states retain significant
political influence.”).
180. See Hyman, supra note 61, at 1481.
181. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 134, at 1142.
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irrelevant in the context of American government, nonresidents would
have no reason to participate in the politics of other states.182 Finally, as
Bill’s story demonstrates, geographic borders and physical distance do not
significantly impede legitimate cross-border activity in a world where
information travels nearly instantaneously and many people can afford to
travel long distances within a short amount of time on a regular basis. The
preservation of federalism, therefore, should not justify nonresident
contribution limits that burden the political association rights of
Americans who deserve the protections as much or more than in-state
residents.
IV. EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF STATE LAWS
RESTRICTING NONRESIDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The First Amendment likely prohibits states from placing special
limitations on the ability of people to donate money to election campaigns
in states where they do not reside.183 Undoubtedly, however, the First
Amendment does not act as a bar on all state laws that burden
constitutionally protected political activity by nonresidents. For example,
neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prevents
Texas from denying California residents the ability to vote in Texas
elections.184 Alternatively, Florida certainly cannot ban a Georgian from
vehemently endorsing a Florida gubernatorial candidate during barroom
banter in Tallahassee. The interesting question, then, is determining where
the constitutional divide should fall. When does the permissible
preservation of a political community stop and the impermissible burdening
182. See id. (“The very fact that individuals from Texas seek to influence
California politics, and vice versa, indicates that the states are critical actors on
the national stage. Cross-state political participation demonstrates states’
importance as sites of governance and identification, not their lack thereof.”).
183. See supra Part III.
184. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985)
(“A State may restrict to its residents, for example, both the right to vote, and the
right to hold state elective office.”) (citation omitted); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 333 (1972) (“We have in the past noted approvingly that the States have
the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political
subdivision.”); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978)
(“[O]ur cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately
restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within
its borders.”) The Court in Holt Civic Club held that residents of an unincorporated
community could be subject to a neighboring city’s police and sanitation
regulations, among others, by state statute even though they could not participate in
the city’s political processes. See Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 68–69.

2018]

COMMENT

627

of speech begin? To what extent may states exclude nonresidents from
participating in their political process without violating the First
Amendment?185
This Comment does not answer these questions definitively. Instead,
it gauges the appropriateness of applying the same constitutional logic that
likely renders state nonresident contribution limits unconstitutional to
other avenues of cross-border political participation. Donating money to a
candidate’s campaign coffers is merely one of myriad ways that people
can participate in state elections. Particularly zealous crusaders may
volunteer to distribute campaign flyers, plant yard signs, or stuff mailing
envelopes. Less ardent supporters may offer simply to put in a good word
with their friends. The universe of potential campaign participation
activities runs the gamut.
Determining exactly when states may limit such behavior to their own
residents without violating the First Amendment has proved tricky. One
often-litigated example involves state laws that prohibit nonresidents from
circulating ballot initiative petitions.186 As with nonresident contribution
limits, courts are split on the constitutionality of such laws,187 and the
United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue.188 For the
most part, federal circuit courts have invalidated such laws on First
185. Residency-based discrimination by states also raises other constitutional
concerns, such as equal protection and privileges and immunities. This Comment,
however, focuses only on First Amendment issues.
186. Ballot initiative petitions, allowed by a handful of states, involve the
process by which voters gather signatures in support of a law or constitutional
amendment to petition either the state’s legislature or its citizens to vote on the issue.
See Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl
.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx (last visited
Jan. 20, 2017) (providing a chart that shows which states allow either ballot initiative
petitions or popular referendums, which involve the process by which voters
petition to hold a vote on whether to keep a law passed by the state’s legislature)
[https://perma.cc/7JFX-JHMB].
187. Compare Chandler v. City of Arvada, 292 F.3d 1236, 1243–44 (10th Cir.
2002) (invalidating petition circulator residency requirement on First Amendment
grounds), and Yes On Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (10th
Cir. 2008) (same), and Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (same),
with Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614, 615 (8th Cir. 2001)
(upholding petition circulator residency requirement against First Amendment
challenge).
188. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197
(1999) (invalidating Colorado’s voter registration requirement for petition circulators
but expressly declining to discuss the constitutionality of its residency requirement
because it was not in dispute in the lawsuit).
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Amendment grounds.189 Although the courts uniformly found some
version of protecting the integrity of the election process to be a
compelling state interest,190 they also often found that states could not
prove that residency requirements were narrowly tailored to prevent
election fraud.191 In essence, as with nonresident contribution limits, the
courts did not deny that states have an interest in protecting the integrity
of their elections. The fatal flaw, instead, involved the states’ use of
residency-based discrimination to achieve their goals.
One of the cases in particular, Yes On Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage,192
resulted in several noteworthy takeaways. In that case, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals ultimately invalidated on First Amendment grounds an
Oklahoma law banning nonresidents from circulating ballot initiative
petitions.193 Even though Oklahoma presented evidence of fraudulent
behavior by some nonresident petition circulators, the court held that the
evidence failed to show that nonresidents “as a class” were more likely to
engage in fraudulent behavior than residents.194 In addition, the court took
the opportunity in a footnote to highlight alarming issues raised by
Oklahoma’s proposed interest in restricting nonresident speech “simply
because the speech may indirectly affect the political process . . . .”195 The
court in Yes On Term Limits, Inc. continued,
To accept the wholesale restriction of the petition process to
residents of Oklahoma as a compelling state interest would have
far-reaching consequences. For example, the prohibition of nonresidents from driving voters to the polls would seemingly be a
logical extension. This court is unwilling to approve as a compelling
state interest the restriction of core First Amendment rights in this
manner.196

189. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Chandler, 292 F.3d at 1242 (failing to narrowly tailor its law to
prevent fraud, malfeasance, and corruption); Yes On Term Limits, 550 F.3d at
1031 (failing to narrowly tailor its law to protect the integrity of the election
process); Nader, 531 F.3d at 1037–38 (failing to narrowly tailor its law to prevent
fraud in the election process).
191. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
192. Yes On Term Limits, 550 F.3d at 1023.
193. Id. at 1030–31.
194. Id. at 1029.
195. Id. at 1028 n.2.
196. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit clearly placed more emphasis on protecting nonresident
political participation than on Oklahoma’s desire to defend its defined
political community, at least in the context of petition circulators.
It requires no stretch of the imagination to apply similar arguments to
protect other nonresident political activities. For example, the Tenth
Circuit’s concerns in Yes On Term Limits, Inc. about “wholesale
restriction”197 of nonresident participation in the ballot initiative petition
process also apply to nonresident contribution limits that effectively ban
nonresident donations once a candidate receives a certain threshold level
of money from nonresidents.198 Residential voting restrictions should be
able to preserve political cohesion sufficiently without help from unnecessary
restrictions on nonresident political activity. A fine line exists between
maintaining a political community and silencing speech as a form of political
protectionism or isolationism. A defining principle of democratic institutions
involves robust public discussion of political issues untethered from
unnecessary government censorship.199 As one scholar wrote,
The value of democratic legitimation occurs . . . specifically
through processes of communication in the public sphere. It
requires that citizens have access to the public sphere so that they
can participate in the formation of public opinion, and it requires
that governmental decision making be somehow rendered
accountable to public opinion.200
Some limits, such as residency-based voting restrictions, generally fit
within the category of appropriate and constitutional residency-based
political discrimination.201 Beyond that, however, the constitutionality of
yet-to-be-challenged or perhaps even yet-to-be-created residency-based
speech restrictions remains hazy. As with nonresident contribution limits,
any state law that burdens nonresident political activity risks invalidation

197. Id.
198. See supra Part II.
199. See generally Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97
VA. L. REV. 477 passim (2011) (explaining the value of free speech to democracy);
James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as The Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491 (defending the view that free speech
doctrine “is best explained as assuring the opportunity for individuals to participate
in the speech by which we govern ourselves”).
200. See Post, supra note 199, at 482.
201. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282 n.13 (1985)
(“A State may restrict to its residents, for example, both the right to vote, and the
right to hold state elective office.”) (citation omitted).
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under one of America’s most sacred societal and institutional values: free
speech.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, when given its next opportunity to do so, should
invalidate state nonresident contribution limits. In today’s highly mobile
society, nonresidents like Bill the restauranteur have many legitimate
interests in states other than the one they legally call home. The First
Amendment protects all Americans,202 and out-of-state residents deserve
more, not less, political association protection than in-state residents.
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